Within the wide literature regarding franchising, a few studies were devoted to the adverse selection phenomena in the franchise relationships, and to the signaling explanation of the franchisors' organizational choices.
Introduction
The literature dealing with franchising networks emphasizes the relevance of the theory of contracts to understand this major phenomenon. The relationships between franchisors and franchisees are indeed characterized by informational asymmetries, and the devices included in franchise contracts can be studied as a way to confront these asymmetries. More precisely, during the last decades, agency-theoretical explanations in terms of moral-hazards, incentives issues and monitoring costs were the dominant direction in franchising research (e.g., Brickley and Dark, 1987; Brickley et al., 1991; Lafontaine, 1992; Lafontaine and Kaufmann, 1994; Shane, 1996; Combs and Ketchen, 1999; Alon, 2000; Lafontaine and Shaw, 2005; Castrogiovanni et al., 2006; Pénard et al., 2011) .
On the contrary, within the wide literature regarding franchising, a few studies were devoted to the adverse selection phenomena in the franchise relationships, and to the signaling explanation of the franchisors' organizational choices. This situation is highlighted by Table   1 , constructed from a survey of 18 of the top ranked reviews in Economics and Management 1 . A total of 87 papers regarding franchising have been counted over the period 2000-2012; 67 of them are empirical papers. From this literature two major theoretical frameworks emerge: agency and resources scarcity theories. Adverse selection and signaling problems are only present in two papers.
This orientation of the literature of the past twelve years is consistent with Lafontaine (1993)'s empirical results. Submitting to US data the predictions deriving from Gallini and Lutz (1992) 's seminal theoretical model of signal in franchising, Lafontaine (1993) concludes that signaling theory is not quite appropriate to study franchising.
However, over the last four decades, most of the empirical works have focused on developed countries. Primarily, the literature relates to the United States where, according to Dant et al. (2011) , modern franchising dates back to at least 1850.
A few studies deal with franchising data from emerging countries, while, as mentioned by Welsh et al. (2006) , emerging markets represent 80% of the world's population and offer the most dynamic potential for long-term growth to businesses, in general, and to franchisors, specifically.
The aim of this empirical paper is to test the signaling theory on Brazilian data in order to see if this framework, which is not well adapted to study franchising in developed countries, would be more suited to understand this phenomenon in emerging markets. Indeed, the previous works dealing with franchising in emerging countries highlight deep differences regarding the two groups of countries. The following section of the paper presents in greater details this analytical framework, and the deriving testable predictions. Empirical specifications are provided in section 3, regarding Brazilian franchising, and regarding the original sample used in this study. In section 4, we estimate a structural equation model capturing the specifications related to the analytical context. The results, partially consistent with the theoretical framework, are discussed in section 5. They suggest that the Brazilian franchisors use signaling devices, and that the necessity to signal the quality of a business concept affects the organizational choices.
The discussion section concludes this empirical paper, and proposes several ways for future research.
Analytical framework and hypotheses development
The theory of information, dealing with the organizational remedies to informational asymmetries, constitutes the theoretical background of this paper. More precisely, the paper is based on the signaling theory, focusing on the contexts of adverse selection, and on the seminal model of Gallini and Lutz (1992) regarding signaling in the franchise relationships.
Business-format franchising networks are based on a common trademark and concept, developed by the franchisor, among legally autonomous downstream units. The success, ie the expansion of the network depends on the capacity to attract new franchisees, which is related to the profitability of the concept.
New franchisors with a valuable concept face a problem of asymmetric information.
Because they have developed the concept, they possess more information about its profitability than the potential franchisees. This private information causes a problem of adverse selection regarding the type of the franchisors: "good type" with a high value business concept versus "bad type" with a low value one.
When entering a network, the franchisees have to make large investments to specific assets. For this reason, they need to acquire information before making their decisions. Gallini and Lutz (1992) demonstrate formally that good type franchisors can signal their type, and therefore provide relevant information to the future franchisees ( Fig. 1 ). The signaling devices are organizational and contractual forms that make the franchisor's revenue highly dependent upon the performance of the business concept. These signaling devices are:
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the presence of company-owned outlets in the network in addition with the franchised units, in other words "dual distribution", and a high level of royalty rate.
Two hypotheses derive from this theoretical context:
H1. The proportion of company-owned outlets is positively related to the value of the business concept.
H2. The level of the royalty rate is positively related to the value of the business concept.
In this analytical context we introduce a gradual learning of information, assuming that the first results regarding the profitability of the concept coexist with the signaling period (Fig. 1) .
For this reason, we formulate the following complementary hypothesis:
H3. The performance of the franchised network during the signaling period is positively related to the value of the business concept.
In the literature on franchising data, the value of the concept, or the brand name value, is often related to the years of the company in business prior to the first franchised unit. This experience allows the upstream firm to develop a profitable concept. This is why we formulate the following hypothesis:
H4. The franchisor's experience is positively related to the value of the business concept. 
Brazilian franchising
The central role of Brazil in the economy of Latin-America is well-known. Brazil stands indeed as the strongest economy of the zone, with several developed sectors such as agriculture, mining, manufacturing and services. This country is a member of the "BRICS"
with Russia, India, China, and South Africa ("BRICS"). These emerging economies have several common features: a large population, a vast territory with a continental strategic dimension, a big amount of natural resources, and a remarkable GDP growth during the last ten years.
The emerging position of Brazil appears also regarding franchising. As presented by 
The Data
In this study we use cross-sectional data regarding the year 2012 from the Brazilian Franchise Association. The sample consists of 179 franchising networks in a wide range of retail and services sectors.
The study variables derived from the theoretical framework are the proportion of companyowned units, measured as the number of company-owned units divided by the total number of outlets in the network, and the royalty rate, defined as a percentage on the downstream sales accruing to the franchisor. Two control variables are included in this study: the network experience in franchising, referring to the time that the franchisor had to develop his business format, and the franchised network market share, referring to the network performance and defined as the proportion of the network turnover in the whole sector turnover. Table 3 presents the sectors in Brazilian franchising used to construct this variable.
Summary statistics regarding the four study variables are provided by Table 4 . This Table shows the heterogeneity within the sample networks regarding three variables:
the proportion of company-owned units, the royalty rates, and the market shares. The networks experience is quite homogenous in the sample, as showed by the means, higher than the standard deviations for this variable.
It is interesting to note that the maximum experience is 50 years, even if the majority of the sample networks have less than a 10 years experience. However, it is worth mentioning that the franchised network with 50 years of experience is not atypical in the sample, because several other networks are close to this situation.
In addition, Table 4 highlights the negative significant correlation between the proportion of company-owned outlets and the franchisor's experience, and between the market share and the franchisor's experience. This second correlation is quite surprising.
The correlation matrix highlights also a positive correlation between the proportion of company-owned units and the network market share.
According to Lafontaine (1993) , a negative correlation sign should be expected between the royalty rate and the proportion of company-owned outlets. This is the case here, but the correlation is not significant.
The structural analysis requires the use of normally distributed data. In order to solve the problem of normality highlighted here by the asymmetry of the variables and the kurtosis values, we use a transformation 2 .
Contractual and organizational choices as signaling devices

Method
In order to submit to data the hypotheses deriving from the signaling theory, we use the structural equation modeling method (SEM) which allows to estimate simultaneous equation models including latent variables. As mentioned by Animesh et al. (2011 ), Bollen (2011 , Squalli et al. (2010) , SEM provides rigorous analyses for model fitting.
The value of a business concept can't be inferred directly and constitutes thus the latent variable (η ) of our econometrical model. According to hypotheses 1 and 2, this variable influences the royalty rate and the proportion of company-owned units in the network, studied here as signals sent by the good type franchisors to the potential franchisees in a context of asymmetric information regarding the latent variable. We assume that, being contractual and organizational choices of the upstream firm, the two signaling devices are stable during the first period (P 1 = {t -1; t}) where the network reputation is not yet established. For this reason, the signals are defined for t -1 and t. The network market share evolves continuously and is taken into account at time t as a performance indicator in line with the value of the business concept. The franchisor's experience is the same at time t and t -1. This variable is introduced in the econometrical model as a proxy for the quality of the business concept. Both variables (market share, experience) allow distinguishing good type franchisors.
The econometrical model is defined as the following system of structural equations:
Where, refers to the value of the business concept.
refers to the intercept in the measurement equation.
refers to the regression coefficients regarding the effect of the latent variable on : refers to the effect indicators of the quality of the business concept ( ) : refers to the error terms which contain all other influences on besides .
The model can be re-written in the next path diagram: Table 5 presents several statistics regarding the overall fit of the estimated model. according to which the model is as well as the saturated one. In other words, it is not possible to conclude that there is a missing path in the model specification.
Results
In addition, the modification indices test shows that a change in the specification of the model is not relevant, and that the model is robust 3 .
The comparative fit index and the Tucker-Lewis index indicate that the model has a good fit (values higher than 0.95). These results are confirmed by the standardized root mean squared residuals (lower than 0.08) and the coefficient of determination (57.5%).
These different and complementary tests allow concluding that the estimated model has a good fit.
The detailed estimation results are reported in Figure 8 , Tables 5 and 7 . These results suggest that, as predicted by H1, the value of the business concept influences significantly and positively the proportion of company-owned units in Brazilian franchising networks (p<0.004). The R-squared for this equation is particularly high regarding crosssectional data (47.8%). This empirical result supports the signaling explanation.
On the contrary, the estimations reveal that the value of the concept has no significant influence on the royalty rate, which does not support H2.
Consistent with H3, the value of the concept impacts significantly and positively the market share (p<0.023). Finally, as predicted, the franchisor's experience in business prior to the first franchised unit is empirically related to the value of the business concept, but the negative sign is reverse to the predicted one. This result confirms the first empirical outcomes regarding the correlation matrix and the negative correlation between the franchisor's experience and the network market share.
Discussion
This empirical paper estimates a structural equation model on recent Brazilian franchising data. The method allows studying the simultaneous influence of the value of a business concept on organizational and contractual signaling devices, and on the market share of the franchised network, taking into account the relationship between the value of the concept and the franchisor's experience.
The empirical results show that the estimated model has a good fit, and they provide several interesting outcomes regarding franchising in emerging markets.
First, the results suggest that the organizational choices of local franchisors in emerging markets differ from what has been observed so far regarding franchising in developed countries. More precisely, the paper provides evidence that signaling may motivate the organizational choices in emerging local systems. This result is particularly interesting knowing that most of the literature dealing with franchising in the framework of the theory of contracts focuses on the agency explanation.
Two signaling devices were identified in the seminal model of Gallini and Lutz (1992) concerning signaling in franchise networks: the royalty rate and the proportion of companyowned units. In terms of signal, these two devices may be considered as substitutes. Our results suggest that this is not the case, and that the franchisors use the organizational form of the network (dual distribution) rather than the contractual design (high level of royalty rate) to signal the value of their business concept to potential franchisees.
As predicted, the value of the concept influences positively the market share during the signaling period. However, the results regarding the franchisor's experience are unexpected.
Instead of a positive relationship between the franchisor's years in business prior to the development of the franchised chain, a negative one is estimated.
The explanation may rely on the context of this study, which deals with an emerging market. It is indeed relevant to suggest that in Brazil, the business environment being halshs-00735573, version 1 -26 Sep 2012
particularly dynamic, the maturity time of a valuable business concept is lower than in developed countries.
Moreover, our results suggest that local business owners with a valuable concept settle quickly their franchised network into a very dynamic environment where consequently competition is strong and where market shares are being distributed. In this context, the "good type" franchisor is both the one who possesses a profitable concept, and who is able to impose it quickly in the form of a franchised network.
Several limitations of our study have to be mentioned, interesting for further researches.
First, our empirical investigation is limited by the cross sectional data. The availability of panel datasets regarding emerging countries would allow consideration of the evolutions, especially when the franchise system enters its mature phase.
In addition, it would be interesting to extend the analysis to other Latin American countries with different levels of economic development.
Finally, our results show that the signaling theory is adequate to understand the organizational choices regarding the ownership structure of franchised networks in emerging markets. However the issue concerning the required level of company-owned units is not addressed here. Further empirical researches could deal with this issue and provide evidence regarding the proportion of company-owned units required to act as an efficient signaling device.
